Top 4 Supplements for 1L Torts:
We need to consider two factors in Tort Liability
- Torts Outline
- Prof. Ursin
- II. Intentional Torts
- Goals of the
Torts System
- Accident reduction, place
liability where it is most likely to prevent harm - Compensation to innocent
victims - Loss distribution
(insurance etc) - Fairness and justice
- Negligence
- The failure to exercise
the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the
legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable
risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or
willfully disregardful of others rights.
- Taking of unreasonable
risk of harm, conduct that creates unreasonable risk of harm- Negligence does not
require intent - Failing
to properly mitigate risk (due care)
- Negligence does not
- Hammontree
v Jenner (seizure) P originally sought
negligence for car crash, but found that it would likely fail on the
grounds that Jenner did everything he could to prevent unreasonable
risk (other than giving up driving). P instead went forward on
grounds of Strict Liability in an attempt to draw a correlation to
product liability.- Magnitude
of risk – As likelihood increases, duty to
protect also increases (if seizures kept occuring)
- Magnitude
- Intent
- State of mind accompanying
an act…the mental resolution or determination to do [the act]
- Purpose to do something,
knowledge of actions, or result is substantially certain to occur
- Purpose
of causing action - Knowledge with substantial
certainty that action will occur
- Garret
(chair) v Dailey (boy) Even if there is no
intent to cause injury or harm, intent can be inferred if the actor
had knowledge a consequence was substantially certain to occur
- Strict Liability
- Liability that does not
depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but based on the
breach of an absolute duty to make something safe.
- Product
manufacturers have a duty to assure that their products are safe
when it is known that the products will be used with out inspection
by the consumer Escola v Coca Cola (extended
to retailers in VanderMark)
- Assault
- The threat or
use of force on another that causes that person to have a reasonable
apprehension of imminent
harmful or offensive contact; the act of putting another person in
reasonable fear or apprehension of an immediate battery by means of
an act amounting to an attempt or threat to commit a battery.
Latin ad+saltare, to
jump at.
- A
physical act | of a threatening nature {or} an offer of corporal
injury | [which] puts an individual | in reasonable fear | of
imminent bodily harm. - Requires apprehension, you
can batter someone with out first assaulting (hit from behind) - Cannot be
fear of future contact - A threat of force intended
to cause contact or apprehension of contact that results in well
founded apprehension of contact
- Voluntary
act - Done with intent (desire
or knowledge of consequences) - Causing threat of contact
that will produce harm
- Must
have apparent present ability to carry out (100 yards away and lunge
at someone, not assault) - State Rubbish
Collectors Assoc. (Trash Union) v. Siliznoff (Trash Collector) 1952
-
- Siliznoff
was given the trash account by his fatehr who was co-account holder
with another union member - Union threatens to beat
him up and burn his truck if he doesnt pay/give account back - Union sues for breach of
K- Counterclaim for ASSAULT
fails NO IMMINENCE
- Counterclaim for ASSAULT
- Siliznoff
- Battery
- The use of force against
another, resulting in harmful or offensive contact. - Intentional infliction of
harmful or offensive bodily contact.
- Harmful/offensive contact
with a person- Including an object in
direct contact with a person (camera, cane, dog on a leash)- Contact with an object
must be harmful
- Contact with an object
- Including an object in
- Offensive
contact must offend a reasonable person- If super sensitive then
the tortfeasor must be aware of this sensitivity (child,
arachnophobia etc) - Non-offensive behavior at
a club may be very offensive at a funeral
- If super sensitive then
- Requires
lack of consent, if
the contact was consented to > not battery- A doctor removes a scar >
battery (maybe you liked the scar)
- A doctor removes a scar >
- Garret
(Old lady) v Dailey (boy) Contact doesn’t
have to be directly with victim, lady fell because chair was moved >
the fall was substantially certain to occur.- An intent to injure is
unnecessary in a situation when a D willfully sets in motion a
force that in its ordinary course causes injury.
- An intent to injure is
- Self-Defense
– Is NOT BATTERY as long as force is met with equal force, you can
only use deadly force when deadly threat is upon you. Cannot use a
knife in a fist fight!- You CAN make
a reasonable mistake in identity when acting in defense of
imminent bodily harm (man accidentally shoots sheriff on his
property during riot Courvoisier v. Raymond
)
- You CAN make
- False
Imprisonment - A restraint of a person in
a bounded area without justification or consent. False imprisonment
is a common -law misdemeanor and a tort. It applies to private as
well as governmental detention. - An unlawful restraint of a
individuals personal liberty or freedom of locomotion.
- Lack of consent AND
- Actual confinement, or
actual or apparent physical barriers –
• If you are free
to leave > not FI.
• If reasonable means of escape >
not FI. Unreasonable escape, jumping out window > is FI• locking someone out > not FI - Conscience of confinement
– unless it causes harm
- Unlawful
restraint may be effected by words alone- Threats of physical force
or other duress - Asserted legal authority
without actual legal authority- Staying to
protect your reputation > not FI Lopez v
Donut
- Staying to
- Threats of physical force
- DAMAGES
- Seffert v LA Transit
- Peters:
was the original
judge: - He believed that the award
should be reversed if it “shocks the conscience/passion
prejudice” - Traynor dissents
(Wants to take her damages away) - pg 703
- Believes that the pain and
suffering awarded was excessive that there was passion and prejudice
in the jury. - Agrees with the law, but
he disagrees and believes that the award does “shock the
conscience” - Basically
LA transit will not pay the damages,
they will just raise bus fares and the public will end up paying the
loss or they have insurance - The damage award is always
arbitrary and cannot be based on any real fact or data - If the defendants action
was reprehensible than maybe there should be pain and suffering - Jaffe’s
opinion Pg
710 - on pain and suffering: “it
is doubtful justice seriously to embarrass a defendant, though
negligent, by real economic loss in order to do honor to plaintiff’s
experience of pain” insurance should not be used either as the
pool of social funds would grow larger each year as a proportion of
national income. No amount of compensation will reverse the damages - Pecuniary damages make the
plaintiff “whole” by paying back loses - Non-pecuniary can never
make a plaintiff “whole” because you can “measure”
pain - Its doubtful justice to
inflict that much on an uninsured individual - A social fund, ie
insurance costs, should not be depleted to pay damages that perform
no specific economic function. - • How
expensive would Health insurance be if it paid out for Pain and
Suffering??? - Posner’s
opinion:
(conservative Reagan appointee) - “most people would
pay a good deal of money” to be free of pain and suffering. If
there was no monetary recourse for victims in pain and suffering
damages then there would be more negligence and thus higher social
costs. - Believes tort law is a
deterrent to future negligent acts “an essential mechanism” - Tort actions are
generally about damages. - Pecuniary loss: income,
medical expenses, past and future - Non-pecuniary: Pain and
suffering, sometimes larger than pecuniary - Judge and jury have
different roles - Jury hears facts witnesses
testimony request for damages, issues a damage for the judge to
review etc - Judge issues the damages
and is thought to be the 13th juror - Judge cannot set the
amount, he can reduce it and tell the plaintiff to either accept or
the case will go to new trial - Damages
- Compensatory
damages: designed to bring a victim back to
original state, as best possible. Two parts:
- Economic(out-of-pocket,
pecuniary): lost wages, property damage, medical expenses, drugs,
future medical expenses, future lost earnings (based on life
expectancy). - Noneconomic
loss (=nonpecuniary):
pain & suffering.
- Attorney’s
Fees: usually 1/3 of award. Economic damages
alone not enough to compensate. - Controls
on nonpecuniary damages: There are no simple solutions, e.g. Capping
nonpecuniary damages to level of economic damages would hurt
unemployed homemakers. Capping them at all would hurt those with the
most grievous, disfiguring injuries.
- Seffert
v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) –
Excessive Damage Award?
- While
the award was admittedly high (she was just a file clerk and got
lots of pecuniary damages), it was not so high as to shock the
conscience and indicate prejudice on the part of the jury. - Note:
Jury and judge (13th
juror) both thought the amt of damages was OK. Appellate court had
an even higher standard of review. - Dissent:
Traynor says
if damage awards keep rising, it puts a strain on a liability system
based on distribution of losses. Also discourages early settlement.
He gives possible guidelines for determining excessiveness: a)
ordinarily should not exceed economic damages, b) should compare to
past awards for similar injuries. Also objected to the per diem
calculation: an opinion not based on evidence that gives jurors the
illusion that they are doing something rational. - III. The Origins
of Negligence Law - Brown v Kendall
(Dog owners with stick in the eye)
- Kendall tried to break up
dog fight with stick, accidentally hits Brown in the eye… ouch! - Can Brown recover for the:
- Trespass = immediate
result of defendants actions? - Case = Consequential
result, domino effect?
- Trespass = immediate
- No, if
the D was acting lawfully, and unintentionally then the P cannot
recover.- Unless the P can prove
that the D did not use Ordinary Care (negligence) on the part of
the D - Traditionally P also
could NOT recover at all! IF he was contributorily negligent - We need to shift loss
when one party is at fault, but not if it is purely accidental AND
the P acted reasonable under the circumstances
- Unless the P can prove
- IV. Negligence
Principle - Negligence
is doing
something an ORP would not do OR not doing
something an ORP would do in the situation under similar
circumstances - Comparative
Negligence, if both parties are found by the
jury to be negligent the amount awarded will be reduced by the
percentage of negligence on the counter party - Standard of
Ordinary Care
- Determined case by case,
based on the facts, and the necessity to guard against danger. - The amount of care an ORP
would use.- An Ordinary Reasonable
Person is:- An average man of
average intelligence or prudence - No excuse for mental
disabilities (too easy to fake) - Physically disabled are
held the the standard of others with the same disability, BUT may
be inherently negligent by participating in certain activities
(Blind person obviously is acting negligently if they are driving
a car) - Exception for Children
UNLESS they are engaging in Adult Activities- Borderline question:
What is an Adult Activity?
- Borderline question:
- NO
Exception for elderly, they have years of experience. - Professionals held to
higher standard (Doctors, Lawyers, etc)- ORP Conduct set by
industry standard
- ORP Conduct set by
- An average man of
- An Ordinary Reasonable
- Failing
to use ordinary care is Negligence- That is conduct which
creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others OR falls below the
standard set by law or the professional (malpractice) - How do you
determine an unreasonable risk of
harm?- You don’t, THE JURY does
- Traditionally (Holmes)
Will take the question away from the jury when
- Traditionally (Holmes)
- You don’t, THE JURY does
- That is conduct which
-
-
-
- There
is clear Policy - The judge knows his
shit (lots of experience with the matter) - When cases are very
similar or repetitive - When the jury is wishy
washy
- There
-
-
- Modern
view (Cardozo)- Always leave to the jury
UNLESS - It is obvious they will
rule one way
- Always leave to the jury
- Adams
(Dumb Kid) v. Bullock (Trolly Owner)- Cost of avoidance was too
high to prevent risk- NO Liability
- Cost of avoidance was too
- Braun
case- Vacant lot wires could
and should have been insulated cheaply- YES Liability imposed
- Vacant lot wires could
- Baltimore
RR v. Goodman 1927 Holmes- Supreme Court made the
rule that IF you cannot hear OR see Train you MUST get out of your
car to look. - RR win’s on appeal
because Goodman was negligent (didn’t take reasonable care)- Wanted to encourage
industrial development
- Wanted to encourage
- Supreme Court made the
- Pokora
v Wabash RR 1934 Cardozo- Silly to impose the
Goodman standard in every case because what if the train comes by
the time you get back to your car - This question should go
to the jury - Reversed and remanded
- Silly to impose the
- Duty to exercise
reasonable care
- There is an unreasonable
risk of harm IF- (The
Foreseeability of Risk) x (The
Probability of Harm) > (The
burden of Avoidance)- Balancing test (Justice
Learned Hand) - WHY? Because this will
shift loss where it is most likely
- Balancing test (Justice
- If the
cost on society to prevent the accident is TOO HIGH then it is
better to let it happen because it rarely ever will
- (The
- Common Carriers
- Utmost
Care Standard imposes the highest degree of
care possible on common carriers.- California
has an Utmost Care statute, judge cannot abolish it - New York
Utmost care no longer needed because we
need to balance the risk/harm with the cost- Economists say Utmost
care has no proof of reducing accidents - Basically Strict
Liability doesn’t make sense to use more care than necessary - As the risk goes up the
care also needs to go up- Has it happened before?
- How serious?
- How much to prevent?
- Economists say Utmost
- California
- Bethel
v. New York Transit 1998- Because Utmost Care is
basically strict liability, not consistent with negligence
balancing principles - As something becomes more
dangerous obviously you need to use more care
- Because Utmost Care is
- Andrews
v. United Airlines 1994 9th
Circuit- Suitcase
falls on someones head - Summary judgement for
Airline REVERSED - Common carriers must use
Utmost Care- Jury to decide if they
did use Utmost Care (if they didn’t they were negligent)
- Jury to decide if they
- Suitcase
- Negligence
Per Se Contributory Negligence established
as a matter of law, so that breach of duty is not a jury question.
Negligence per se usually arises from a statutory violation
- Modern cases of cases of
Contributory Negligence Per Se are more P friendly - To determine Negligence
Per Se:
- Check
if P is in the class of persons meant to be protected by the statute - Check if the harm is of
the type intended to be prevented by the statute, THEN - Make sure the statute
is a “Safety Standard” Life and Limb. And a breach is negligence
per se UNLESS excused by emergency or temporary impossibility
- Compliance
with a statute does not always mean due care was used - Just because adherence
would have prevented the harm does not always mean care was breached
- Martin
v. Herzog (Ct.App. NY 1920)- Martin P was killed by
Herzog D in an auto collision - Martin CANNOT recover
because violating a statute is Negligence Per Se (and comparative
negligence not around yet) - Carzozo opinion says that
breach of a statute is ALWAYS Negligence (Per Se)
- Martin P was killed by
- Tedla
v. Ellman (Ct.App. NY, 1939)- P walking along freeway
(In same direction of traffic) on less busy side of the street are
hit from behind - Statute says you MUST
walk against traffic so you can see cars coming BUT- Walking against traffic
side of the street was very busy that day and therefore more
dangerous
- Walking against traffic
- Alludes
that there may be two types of statutes (so not to fully overturn
Herzog)- Safety Standard (To
protect life and limb): Breaking these statutes would always be
dangerous and therefore Negligence Per Se (Herzog type statutes) - Rules of The Road: Can
be broken in some circumstances if it is more dangerous to follow
- Safety Standard (To
- Excuses
to break a statute: Emergency, necessity, reasonable efforts to
comply, efforts to comply present more risk (Tedla)
- P walking along freeway
- V. Proof of
Negligence - Burden
of Proof: P must prove negligence AND has
the burden of proving that the defendant’s conduct fell below the
standard of reasonable care. - For Negligence
- You MUST first DETERMINE
DUTY - THEN and only then can you
determine IF there was a BREACH
- Constructive
Notice: P must prove the danger was visible
and apparent. It is not enough that the store caused the danger
- To infer
negligence the P must prove that the danger was apparent AND was
there long enough to be noticed and cleared if due
care was used - length of time very
important because the danger has to be there long enough to be
notice- Time can be implied by
circumstantial evidence → Dirty floor - P cant recover based on
negligent inspection and cleaning process, still must prove it was
there long enough to be noticed
- Time can be implied by
- Negri v. Stop &
Shop (NY Ct.App.1985 pg87)
- Plaintiff fell back, didnt
hit shelf (didnt cause jars to fall). Notices broken baby food on
the floor. - Baby food was
dirty and messy (shows constructive notice
if due care was used) - P has a prima
facie case (Facts show at first sight,
without further inspection) - Jury told “if you can
infer that the slippery surface was caused by the jars, AND the
store had sufficient time to find it” THEN P can recover.
- Gordon v.
American Museum of Natural History (NY Ct.App.1986 pg88)
- Slips and falls on wax
paper at museum - Claims it was paper from
concession stand - P failed to prove that the
wax paper was known to be on steps OR that it had been there long
enough to be noticed. (Probably blew onto the steps seconds earlier)
- Negri and Gordon =
Different outcomes because the length of time the dangerous
condition existed. - Business
Practice Rule (Mode of Operation)
- TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS
- VT 1998 less expansive
→ AZ 1987 more expansive
- VT 1998 less expansive
- ?Almost
a version of Strict Liability? :O - Applies to self service
stores where you help yourself to merchandise - Originated for
supermarkets where customers would drop produce, milk, etc - Method of business
produces regular foreseeable risk - The MERCHANT
bears the burden of proving steps were
taken to avoid foreseeable risk.
- Randal
v. K-Mart (US Ct.App 2nd
Cir. 1998 VT pg90)
- REFUSED to
expand the Business Practice Rule (like Chiara
did!!) here → - Birdseed
on floor at K-Mart, slip fall - No
constructive notice, P sought to invoke the “Business
Practice Rule” which applies to Self Service Method of Business- Your method of business
produces, regular AND foreseeable risk - Meant to
apply to self service supermarkets.
- Your method of business
- VT
did not require constructive notice for
BusPracRule - BUT refused
to apply the BusPracRule, because this would make the exception the
rule and open up any retailer that was not a
full service retailer. - K-Mart wins
because no evidence showed that their method
of selling birdseed created a foreseeable risk
- Chiara v. Fry’s
Food Stores (AZ 1987 pg91)
- Mode of
Operation Rule (Alternative to the
BusPracRule in other juris) - P not req to show notice
if the merchant could reasonably anticipate that a hazardous
condition will regularly arise - Court here
sees no reason to limit this rule to
Produce or Pizza - Crème rinse spilled on
floor - Jury to determine if
“Fry’s could have anticipated that the sealed bottles regularly
were opened and spilled.” - IF SO then
the P can recover IF Fry’s failed to exercise
Reasonable Care.
- Lanier v.
Wal-Mart Stores (KY 2003 pg91)
- “The court
4-3 overruled a long line of cases in holding that when a customer
slips on a wet spot…of a self-service store, the burden shifts to
the store owner to negate inferences of negligence” - Feels this is too close to
strict liability - ???? Shifts back to P
bears burden to prove negligence. ????
- Res Ipsa
Loquitur (Convo w/ Curious George) - Latin “The thing speaks
for itself”
- The accident must be of a
kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence - It must be caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant - It must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the Plaintiff
(cannot be Contributory Negligence)
- CA give more weight
to Res Ipsa. Creates an assumption affecting the burden of proof.
The jury will be told to Find Negligence, UNLESS the D has shown
enough evidence that they Were Not Negligent.
- No evidence OR less than
enough to disprove → Then D was Negligent P wins
- Byrne v. Boadle
- Barrel falls out of
window, hits P in the head
- Barrels
dont normally fall? YES dont fall out of windows unless someone is
negligent. - Exclusive control? YES It
is the duty of the warehouse to keep barrels from falling - Contrib Negligence? NO the
P did not Contrib by walking past window.
- Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co.
- Bottles came from manuf
- Reused by distributor, not
subjected to testing for defects- Use balancing test for
the cost of avoidance/testing
- Use balancing test for
- Cases
can be abused during shipping - HOLDING
– Expanded Res Ipsa Loquitur
Manufacturer Strictly Liable. But damages
limited, pain & suffering not to exceed pecuniary- Jury said yes this is a
proper use of res ipsa loquitur - Bottle wouldn’t
ordinarily explode - Bottler had exclusive
control (debatable) - P did not contribute to
accident
- Jury said yes this is a
- In Brown v Kendall
it was about shifting loss - Now with Escola v Coca
Cola it is about distributing loss - D more likely to be
insured, or able to distribute losses by raising prices - Reasons for
Strict Liability
- The safety
- The application of
liability should make manufacturers inspect more carefully - Liability costs are
shifted from plaintiff to defendant, in old days had to sell farm
and pay plaintiff - Most manufacturers have
insurance for liability and so the public ends up paying anyways - Traynor wants
non-pecuniary not to exceed pecuniary - At the time Traynor had
said there should be Strict Liability but no court had yet found it
to be so
- Vandermark v.
Ford Motor
- Breaks locked up crashed
injured Vandemarks - Problems with warranty
law, the manufacturer says look it was the retailer who installed
wrong. - HOLDING
Traynor says
retailers are subject to strict liability, because they are the only
party the consumer works with.- Retailer liability
makes safety in two ways- Retailers can pressure
manuf to create safer products (they can also sue the manuf, or
threaten to not sell their products) - They can inspect the
products in some cases - Compared to the
consumer, the retailer can prevent accidents more than the
consumer
- Retailers can pressure
- Retailer liability
- Elmore v.
American Motors 1969
- Rambler was purchased,
driveshaft falls of the car, car swerves across road crashes into
BYSTANDER WHO SUES - Bystander
had no privity and wasn’t even a user - No court had ever allowed
the bystander to recover. - But Peters says if
anything the bystander should be entitled to greater protection,
because consumers can at least inspect the product.
- Strict Liability
Spread Quickly to:
- Retailers
- Then to lessors BOTH short
AND long-term leases - Bystanders because they
are otherwise defenseless - STOPs AT SERVICES that use
defective products- Manufacturer still
strictly liable, service provider NOT LIABLE
- Manufacturer still
- Traynor
– Says Strict
Liability rule provides greater incentives for safety than
negligence rules do - Three Types of
Defective Products
- Manufacturer
Defect – Came
off the assembly line bad - Design
Defect – Too
dangerous AS designed - Warning/Instruction
Defects –
Failed to give adequate warning of danger “do not eat/touch/stand
on/etc.”
- Barker Two
Pronged Test For Defectiveness
- Excessive Preventable
Danger - Ordinary consumer
expectations when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner
- Restatement
3rd
NOW TRIUMPHS for defects !!!
- One who sells any
product that is defective/dangerous is subject to liability IF- seller is engaged in
business of selling such product (merchant) AND - it is expected/does
reach the consumer without substantial change in condition of the
product
- seller is engaged in
- The
rule in (1) applies even though- The seller has
exercised all possible care in manufacture of product - the is no privity and
the user has no relationship with the seller
- The seller has
- Ybarra v.
Spangard (1944) Supreme Ct.
- P goes in for
appendectomy, comes out with injured arm - Not sure WHO injured him
- Without Res Ipsa is could
lead to “conspiracy of silence” - HOLDING When P gets
an unusual injury to an unrelated part of the body while unconscious
ALL the D who had interaction CAN be held LIABLE unless they can
show they were not negligent. Meaning anyone who even stepped foot
in the room will have burden of proof against negligence - NOTE Ybarra is a VERY
EXPANSIVE view of Res Ipsa
- Caveat – Make
sure you SUE EVERYONE, because if you miss a possible responsible
party you may loose out on recovery → - Inouye v. Black
- Tries to use Ybarra
precedent - Metal wire from neck
surgery breaks off later and causes injury
-
- P
contrib neg? NO - Doesnt ordinarily occur?
NO - Dr. in exclusive control?
NO here lies the problem!
- P
- P only
sues Dr. - HOLDING Dr. wins
because P should have sued everyone, manufacturer, hospital, staff
etc.
- Traynor says :: BE
VERY CAREFUL probably SHOULD NOT USE res ipsa loquitur OUTSIDE
MEDICAL profession → - Fireman’s Fund
Am. Ins. Co. v Knobbe
- Hotel burns
- Ins Co tries to sue hotel
guests under Res Ipsa - HOLDING summary
judgement for D, court does not wish to extend Ybarra this
far because where would you draw the line?
- VI. Medical
Malpractice - Doctors
must follow the ordinary
medical/professional standard of care
- Ordinary
Medical Standard is set by the industry
according to what an ORP Doctor would/should do - Traditionally
expert testimony had to be “same” field - NOW
it is “similar” field - Traditionally
same locale - NOW
national standard – because of
AdvInModTech and “conspiracy of silence” - Takes into account
emergency situations - DONT need expert testimony
if obvious to jury ie left scalpel in stomach
- There must be
consent for medical procedures
- Doctor can remove scar
without asking (tumor would be different in emergency) - WARNINGS of the procedure
– Dr MUST give warnings of Ordinary Medical Standard- CA is more strict, must
give ALL warnings no matter what, ALL alternate procedures, AND
must be in lay terms
- CA is more strict, must
- P
has burden to prove that lack of information swayed
them to the procedure. Judged by ORP standard At Time of Surgery NOT
after surgery for obvi reasons
- Sheeley
v. Memorial Hospital- Sheeley
injured at birth sues 2nd
year family practitioner. - Traditional Rule refused
expert testimony from ObGYN because she was only a “similar
practice”
- Sheeley
- Soares
v. Vestal- Court refused testimony
from “over qualified” witness - AND because he hadnt
practiced since 1975 (VA requires within 1 year)
- Court refused testimony
- Buja
v. ? Overrules Soares- Asserts
national standard
- Asserts
- VII. “No Duty”
Rules
- Introduction
- First establish if there
IS/ISN’T a duty- Looking at cases where
the D claims he did not owe a duty
- Looking at cases where
- There
seems to be a clear long-term movement towards recognizing a
general duty of due care UNLESS there is an exception- As
opposed to traditional rules only imposing duties for special
relationships- Innkeeper, common
carriers, maufacturers etc
- Innkeeper, common
- As
- NONFEASANCE
vs MISFEASANCE- Usually no
duty to rescue a third party ==>- Nonfeasance is a
failure to act, DO NOTHING- Classic example baby
on train tracks - Or drowning surfer
- BUT if you start to
help and screw up →
- Classic example baby
- Nonfeasance is a
- Misfeasance,
started to help but SCREWED UP- Didn’t
use duty of due care/negligent - Rescue baby but then
carelessly drop it - Rescue surfer, but pull
him by the ear now he is deaf- Exception
to this → Tarasoff
- Exception
- Didn’t
- Usually no
- First establish if there
- Affirmative
Duty- Tarasoff v. Regents of
the Univ of California- Tarasoff
Rule – Dr. has an affirmative duty to
warn third parties of danger- Expands exceptions to
the no duty rule
- Expands exceptions to
- Podar
tells University Psych he is going to kill Tatiana Tarasoff - Psych doesnt warn
Tarasoff - HOLDING
Dr Liable to warn third party of danger ie
“Tarasoff Rule” simply because of special relationship to ONE
party (the killer) - California
and others are steadily abolishing the no duty rule (with
exceptions like Tarasoff), but still hard to draw a bright line. - Some have accepted or
expanded, others like CA have adopted limitations like:- Cole v. Taylor –
Murderer tries to sue Shrink for not stopping her, CA court calls
BS rejects Tarasoff applications here
- Cole v. Taylor –
- Increased
Duties are Judge made standards like:- common carriers →
utmost care - manufacturers →
strict liability - doctors → ordinary
medical practice
- common carriers →
- AFTER
Tarasoff- Dr have no duty to warn
others of an infected person, ie AIDs, plague, leprosy, etc - POLICE – in Tarasoff
held the murderer but then released him also NO DUTY
- Dr have no duty to warn
- Tarasoff
- Tarasoff v. Regents of
- Landowners
and Occupiers- Traditional Rules
- Invitee ::
WORKER for business, OR open to PUBLIC. the
highest held visitor {
Invited ≠ Invitee } must take affirmative action to fix a danger
→ Duty for Almost Anything. Must actively seek out dangers,
liable even if danger was unknown. - Licensee ::
FRIEND, on the property with permission. Land
NOT PUBLIC. Duty to make safe KNOW DANGERS, (No duty to discover
dangers) AND NO wanton harm, or concealed traps, but
also due care if you are running your lawnmower. - Trespasser
:: traditionally owed no
duty, someone who enters land with no permission. Sometimes there
is implied permission ie sidewalk for solicitor
BUT NO wanted
harm, or concealed traps
- Invitee ::
- MODERN
RULE (Some Jurisdictions)- No distinction, everyone
owed a duty EXCEPT- Flagrant trespassers
intending to commit a felony
- Flagrant trespassers
- No distinction, everyone
- CHILD
TRESPASSERs Special Rule:
(CA DOESNT USE) A possessor of land is subject to liability for
physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an
artificial condition upon the land IF- the
landowner knows children are likely to trespass,
AND - landowner
knows the or should have know that the condition could cause harm
or death to such children,
AND - the
children are too young to discover the dangerous condition,
AND - the
balance of eliminating the danger v the risk to children
[BALANCING Test], AND - the landowner fails to
exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger
- the
- Recreational
Use Statutes- Most states limit
liability for land used in recreation (natural dangers) - Others (Like CA
Suprme.Ct) Abandoned suitability, any open property owner liable- This means
paradoxically that a thief who isnt recreating is owed a duty of
due care - A child who is
recreating is covered under RUS and is not owed due care!!!! (No
suitability excuse so that means a constr site is a “Recreational
Area” because child is recreating)- Legislature wont
change this because there is no money in it, it would take a
lobby group to convince the legis to change it
- Legislature wont
- This means
- Most states limit
- Rowland
v. Christiansen- Abolished
three types of distinctions and everyone is owed due care - Some states have only
abolished licen/invit but kept trespass distinction - HELD
that landowners owe a duty of care to all
on their property- Except flagrant
trespassers, with intent to commit a felony therein
- Except flagrant
- Abolished
- Carter
v. Kinney (MO 1995)- Kinney hosted a bible
study for the church - Carter slips and falls
on ice from night freeze - Is carter an Invitee
(owed full duty of care) OR Licensee (No duty to warn, just no
traps or wanton) - HOLDING Licensee D wins,
because social guests are licensees in MO. No business motive for
P to be there AND it was not open to the public!
- Kinney hosted a bible
- Heins
v. Webster County (NB 1996)- Man visits daughter at
hospital (“friend”), debatable to discuss working as Santa - Slips on ice in doorway
- ISSUE should the court
abolish invitee/licensee distinction? - HOLDING
yes Abolish Distinction Inv/Licnsee. Because the
focus should be on the foreseeability of the injury, not the
status of the person who enters the property. - DISSENT says we shouldnt
impose a duty where traditionally there isnt one
- Man visits daughter at
- Duty
to protect against Crime pg210- Threshold question,
if you had prior similar crimes then you have a duty to protect
safety- California says thats
arbitrary, first time crime happens on premises—there may be
lots of crime in surrounding area. and now your not liable just
coz it never happened here before - CA say no no no the
issue lies on foreseeability- Now it goes to the
jury, a very expansive view, jury decides if it is foreseeable - CA Supreme Court pulls
it back – Mere foreseeability not enough, there must be a very
high degree of foreseeability - High degree of
foreseeability is rarely met without prior similar crimes.
Almost requires similar SAME crime - Court
clarifies it just has to be similar crimes, but doesnt always
even need a prior…but usulaly do
- Now it goes to the
- California says thats
- Posecai
v. Wal-Mart Sores, Inc. → - Four
(4) Different Rules (in diff juris)- Specific Harm Rule –
Landlord must be aware of specific imminent harm - Prior Similar Incident
Test, Rule – Examine recency, frequency, and similarity of
prior similar crime on premises OR nearby - Totality of Harm Rule –
Foreseeability under all circumstances, lack of prior similar
crime doesnt stop liability (criticized as imposing a “duty to
protect”) - Balancing Test Rule –
the degree of foreseeability must outweigh the cost to prevent
harm. High degree of foreseeability if heavy burden to prevent.
- Specific Harm Rule –
- Ann
M v. Pacific Plaza (Pacific Beach
Nearby Bank had been robbed,
purse snatching, pantsing.
Plaza said we have no record
Use
4 rules and apply- Aware of Imminent harm?
NO - Prior Similar? Toss Up,
shoulda known - Foreseeability always?
NO not clear at time of rape - Balancing test? Goes to
jury, almost always requires prior similar (2)- HOLDING
No duty owed to Ann M 🙁- Defendants
did not have notice of prior similar incidents, but they do
have duty to discover prior events Records
show that they didnt have priors similar (doesnt have to be
identical, just similar) Council
for Ann M conceded that they were not similar crimes (Lost
because of this probably)
- Defendants
- HOLDING
- Aware of Imminent harm?
- Threshold question,
- Traditional Rules
- Emotional
Distress- Traditional Duty Based
Rule of ED- Developed in the 19th
century - Said man up, dont be a
pussy- Used to require
physical harm - then slight impact
- then MODERN (just fear)
- Used to require
- Concerned
about fraudulent claims
- Developed in the 19th
- Modern
Rule- Direct Victim
- Reasonably foreseeable
ED
- Reasonably foreseeable
- Direct Victim
- Traditional Duty Based
-
-
-
-
- Leg
in a box OR telegram – husband’s dead…J/K
- Leg
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Fear
for your own safety/physical harm - Expanded to fear for
others safety TWO VIEWS →- Dillon
- Thing
- Fear
- Innocent
Bystander- Mother watching child
die- MOST COURTS adopt Zone
of Danger- Mom can recover only
if she was in the immediate zone of physical danger
- Mom can recover only
- MOST COURTS adopt Zone
- Mother watching child
- Loss
of consortium- Husbands and wives can
generally recover - Parents
can recover for children- BUT children cannot
recover for lost parent (CA and most others)
- BUT children cannot
- Husbands and wives can
-
- Dillon
v. Legg- First court to abandon
traditional rule, looks at following factors- Was the P close to the
accident? Or far away? - Is the ED a direct
result of the accident? Or result of hearing from others after? - Were the P and victim
closely related? Ie Thing test
- Was the P close to the
- First court to abandon
- Thing
v. LaChusa- HOLDING recovery only IF
- the
observer is a closely related family member- Blood, marriage,
relatives living in household, parents, siblings, children, and
grandchildren
- Blood, marriage,
- Observer
must be present at the scene AT THE TIME accident occurs AND be
aware of the harm being caused - Observer must
suffer serious ED greater than disinterested witness
- the
- HOLDING recovery only IF
- Gammon
v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, Inc. (Maine 1987)- Package came in mail,
supposed to be deceased’s belongings - instead he got a severed
leg - HOLDING Damages
can only be awarded when such harm reasonably could be expected to
befall the ORP with average sensitivity- base decision on
foreseeability, IS it foreseeable that severe ED could result?
- base decision on
- Package came in mail,
-
- Economic
Loss- Two categories
- No physical harm to
anyone or anyones property- ex. An accounting firm
gives the wrong balance sheet to a business. - A third party makes a
deal with the business that is bad because of the accounting
mistake. - CAN they SUE the
ACCOUNTANT even though no K/privity?- Some Cts yes some no?
- Lawyer
files late → Now P cant sue?- Malpractice held to a
competent lawyer standard - Some Cts still require
privity
- Malpractice held to a
- ex. An accounting firm
- No physical harm to
- Two categories
- Immunities
- Contributory
Negligence (Abolished by)- PURE Comparative
Negligence (CA)- California adopted
“PURE Comparative Negligence”- Li
v. Yellow Cab 1975 - P can recovery even
if he is 99% responsible- BUT will only
recover 1% of the damages
- BUT will only
- Li
- California adopted
- Modifies
Comparative Negligence (Other juris)- P cannot recover if
he is 51% at fault
- P cannot recover if
- PURE Comparative
- Must
have Physical harm to person or property- You cannot recover for
economic loss here unless the P is harmed. - Businesses in a disaster
area cannot sue for lost business – unless super foreseeable - Interfamily immunity –
some states still have, cant sue family.- CA Abolished as did
most others
- CA Abolished as did
- Governmental
immunity is handled by specific codes on what is allowed
- You cannot recover for
- Will
liability waivers be enforceable? Tunkle Factors →-
- Engages
in a service of great importance to the public - The business will
perform it service on any member of the public - the business uses the
importance of its service as an unfair bargaining chip - before performing the
essential service the business provides an essential contract
that you must sign, and will not allow you to pay a fee to be
protected from negligence - As a result of the
transaction the user is placed in the care of the business and
subject to the rick of the businesses negligence.
- Engages
-
- Contributory
VIII.
Defenses
- pg478-81
- DONT LOOK TO the
PLAINTIFF’s assumption of risk, ASSESS the DEFENDANT’s DUTY first! - Is there a duty (if so,
what is the duty? (primary assumption of risk)- No Duty for SPORTS
Doctrine- Duty rules are made by
the courts on a case by case basis, as a matter of law. Duty rules
apply to a particular category of activities (ie Sports) and are
determined based on the parties relationship too the sport
(Players, Coaches, Spectators etc). No duty rules are not based on
specific facts. - After a no-duty rule is
adopted the question will STILL go TO JURY to apply the no-duty
rule to the particular facts of the case. UNLESS the judge belives
the jury could only reach one conclusion
- Duty rules are made by
- Intentional
Injury/Recklessness Rule for “Sports”- “Whether
[a] defendant has a legal duty to avoid such conducts or protect
the plaintiff against risk of harm…depends heavily upon the
nature of the sport [and] also…on the defendant’s role in, or
relationship to, the sport.” - There are several
different categories of defendants - Policy decisions aim to
avoid “alter[ing] the nature of the sport by deterring…[a
part’y] vigorously engaging in [the sport] activity”- Policy to avoid a
“Chilling Effect” on the sport
- Policy to avoid a
- “Whether
- Application
to the Categories of Defendants- Co-Participants: No Duty
(Other than not to intentionally injure)- Knight v. Jewett
(1992)- Super bowl touch
football game, girl falls down, finger stepped on - No duty to protect
between players - Players on have a duty
not to intentionally harm AND not to engage in conduct wildly
outside the ordinary range of activity for the sport (ie No
tackling in a Tennis game)
- Super bowl touch
- Knight v. Jewett
- Coaches:
No Duty (But cannot be reckless)- Kahn v.
East Side Union High- 14
year old diver, tells coach she is afraid to dive. Coach makes
her dive. She breaks her neck on a practice dive into shallow
racing water. - No duty, coaches role
is to push players to excel. A duty would chill this- Remanded to determine
if coach was reckless
- Remanded to determine
- 14
- Kahn v.
- Owners
of Sports Facilities: Probably Not- Ratcliff v. San
Diego Baseball Club- Limited duty to owner,
(enough netted seats for people) - No duty for player who
accidentally threw bat
- Limited duty to owner,
- Connoley
v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (NO DUTY)- Signed a waiver form
ticket (not enough to establish zero liability) - Skied into a pole
- HOLDING
Mammoth entitled to summary judgement because P failed to
establish a duty owed to him.
- Signed a waiver form
- Ratcliff v. San
- Co-Participants: No Duty
- No Duty for SPORTS
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Cause
in Fact
- Cause
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- We need to consider
two factors in Tort Liability
- Cause
in Fact – Facts
proving that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff’s harm in a physical or scientific way- The court consistently
denies liability in tort when the defendants negligent actions are
not the cause of the plaintiffs injury - “BUTT FOR” But
for X then Y would not have occurred - The defendants actions
NEED NOT BE THE ONLY CAUSE, just one of the causes
- The court consistently
- Proximate
or Legal Causation
– Does the defendant have a valid legal argument that the
circumstances of the event would prevent him from being liable for
damages to the plaintiff- Polemis (1) Allows UH (2)
Doesnt address UP - Wagon mound (1) No
recover for UH - Cardozo (Palsgraf) (1)
Yes to UH (2) No to UP - Andrews (Palsgraf D) (1)
Yes to ← UH (2) Yes UP included
- Polemis (1) Allows UH (2)
- Stubbs
v. City of Rochester Ct
App NY 1919 pg340
- Defendant supplied water
to the plaintiff maintaining two pipelines, lines got crossed sewage
in drinking water- Plaintiff became ill from
Typhoid fever which can be cause by a number of elements
- Plaintiff became ill from
-
-
- Drinking
polluted water - Raw fruits and veggies
that were grown using human excrement to fertilize the soil - Consumption of shellfish
(Not common - Infected Milk and veggie
- Houseflies in certain
localities - Contact with infected
person - Ice with typhoid bacilli
- Fruits Veggies etc
washed in contaminated water - UKNOWN vague medical
causes
- Drinking
-
- HOLDING
Judge does not
feel this rule is so inflexible as to require the P to disprove all
other causes- “If
two or more possible cases exist, for only one of which a defendant
may be liable, and a party injured establishes facts from which it
can be said with reasonable certainty
that the direct cause of the injury was the one for which the
defendant was liable the party has copmplied with the spirit of the
rule” - It is sufficient for the
P to prove with Reasonable Certainty that the direct cause of harm
resulted from the D actions
- “If
- Proportional
Liability - Suppose that Rochester
could show that of the 58 infected, 10 woulda got anyways.
- UNDER Proportional
Liability each plaintiff would get 48/58ths of the award
- Stairwell cases:
- Wolf
v. Kaufmann 1929
NY: P falls down the darkly lit stairs and dies.- HOLDING case dismissed,
simply a conjecture that the darkness was the cause in fact. No
proof that the darkness was the but for cause.
- HOLDING case dismissed,
- Hinman
v. Sobocienski 1991
AL: Tenant found injured at bottom of dark stairs, trial court
directed verdict for D.- HOLDING Reversed P
wins. “When a resident is then found injured at the bottom of
those stairs, a reasonable inference is that the dangerous
condition more than likely played a substantial part in the
mishap.”- Probably held for
public policy, because the landlord is in the best position to
remedy the unsafe premises by providing better lighting, and can
also distribute “losses” by raising rent.
- Probably held for
- HOLDING Reversed P
- Preemptive
Causation
- Asbestos
Cases Traditionally
courts only allowed limited partial preemptive recovery- MODERN courts allow you
to recover 100% IF you can show that you have a +50% chance of
developing cancer caused by the asbestos.- Some suggested
probabilistic recovery → 20% chance of disease = 20% recovery
- Some suggested
- MODERN courts allow you
- Shifting the
Burden of Proof, and Market Share Theory:
- Both
CA and NY adopt that Liability is SEVERAL ONLY, meaning only
responsible for their own portion of liability.- In contrast to Joint &
Several Liability (JSL) where each D could be liable for 100% of
the recovery if other D’s are insolvent.
- In contrast to Joint &
- CALIFORNIA
rule: Requires that you haul in the MAJORITY of the Market (Add all
Ds together, if each has 1% of the market then 51 manufacturers to
equal 51% of the market). Each manufacturer is responsible only for
his share of the market, often leading to less than 100% recovery
for the P.- IF you disprove your
pill/liability as a manufacturer YOU ARE NOT LIABLE
- IF you disprove your
- New
YORK rule: Does NOT need a majority of the market as D’s. BUT you
are LIABLE even IF you DISPROVE your product caused harm.
- Hymowitz
v. Eli Lilly Co. pregnant women take
drug, daughters get sick then daughters sue.- Allowed recovery based on
the ^^ market share theories. Refuses to hold the manufactures
Joint & Several, and holds them Several only (independently
liable for their own share of the market).
- Allowed recovery based on
- Sindell
case